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DEFINING SEX
EDWARD SCHIAPPA*
I
INTRODUCTION
This essay describes some of the challenges involved with defining “sex” as a
means of categorizing humans. The question “What is the definition of ‘sex’?”
may seem simple enough, but in fact any answer requires a commitment to a
specific definitional practice. This essay describes three approaches to the practice of definition— lexical, real, and pragmatic—in order to explain why a
pragmatic approach is the most useful in matters of law and public policy in
general and with the construction of regulations regarding “sex” in particular.
The essay identifies scientific as well as socio-political factors contributing to
the current definitional “rupture” over how to define sex. Examples of specific
contexts in which a pragmatic approach to definition is necessary are discussed
including single-sex schools and places of incarceration.
II
A SHORT PRIMER ON DEFINITIONS1
Lexical definitions—sometimes called nominal definitions—are what are
found in dictionaries. In theory, dictionaries provide the latest empirical record
of how words are actually used. Common dictionary definitions describe the
most popular usage of words by language-users in general, while specialized or
technical dictionaries—such as law dictionaries—report how those in a particular language community have used a word.
Real definitions are attempts to delineate what something really is. Socrates,
as portrayed by Plato and Xenophon, formulated the ti esti question “What is
it?”, which is more commonly referred to as the “What is X?” question. Plato’s
dialogues often portray the characters trying to provide what would later be
called real definitions to answer such questions as “What is Justice?” “What is
Piety?” and “What is Rhetoric?” To answer questions of the form “What is
X?” implies that we can identify X’s nature or essence—those attributes without which an X would not be an X. Aristotle is credited for the standard defini-
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1. This section draws from EDWARD SCHIAPPA, DEFINING REALITY: DEFINITIONS AND THE
POLITICS OF MEANING (2003); RICHARD ROBINSON, DEFINITION (1950); and Anil Gupta, Definitions, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Summer 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/definitions [https://perma.cc/D4Q9-7BFE].
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tional form involving genus and difference: An X is (a kind of) class name that
has such-and-such attributes.
Real definitions typically are involved when someone posits a question of
the form “What is X?” or attempts to offer a definition based on what he or she
believes X really or truly is. This can be described as a purported fact of essence. Lexical definitions, by contrast, describe a purported fact of usage.
Language users typically do not stop to think about the difference between
facts of usage and facts of essence with respect to definitions. We assume the
two are coterminous. People use “bachelor” to describe unmarried men because, after all, that is what bachelors really are. The often unspoken and unexamined belief that definitions unproblematically refer both to the nature of X
and to how the word X is used—that is, the assumption that facts of usage and
facts of essence about X are the same—is what can be called the “natural attitude” toward definitions.
Most of the time, the natural attitude toward definition works just fine. Indeed, it would be hard to imagine how a language community could communicate successfully if we constantly doubted the congruence of facts of usage and
facts of essence. There are, however, important occasions when there is a
breakdown in the natural attitude, and to understand such occasions we need to
distinguish between definitional gaps and definitional ruptures.
A definitional gap occurs when someone hears or reads a word they don’t
recognize and need to look up the definition, such as someone hearing reference to a “shingle” haircut or hearing someone describe a political belief as “antediluvian.” Such gaps are typically easy to fill under most circumstances. Even
if several definitions of the same word are listed in a dictionary, an experienced
language user normally can consider the context in which the word appears and
correctly identify the relevant definition.
A definitional rupture occurs when a break occurs between facts of usage
and facts of essence such that process of definition itself becomes an issue.
Questions about why we are defining a term in a particular context become salient, as well as the question of how we define words. Such ruptures may be
prompted by various factors, including technological, political, and social
change. Two examples can illustrate the point.
Consider how the legal definition of “death” changed in the 1970s and
1980s.2 Prior to the change, the standard definition used to declare a person
“dead” was the cessation of cardio-respiratory activities. As technology
changed such that patients could have their cardio-respiratory activities maintained with the aid of machines, the standard definition became one of the cessation of brain activities—so-called “brain death.” The legal change was important because there were patients who could be considered alive under one
definition but dead under another, and indeed the widely-noted case of Tucker

2. See Schiappa supra note 1, at Chapter 3.
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v. Lower3 saw wrongful death charges brought against a doctor for harvesting
organs for transplant before the patient was considered dead by the applicable
law.4
Also consider the changes in most jurisdictions’ definitions of “rape.” For
centuries, coerced sex within a marriage was not considered rape. As recently as
the 1999 edition of Black’s Law Dictionary, the first definition for rape was still
“unlawful sexual intercourse committed by a man with a woman not his wife
through force and against her will.”5 Most states prior to 1975 had some sort of
exemption based on marital status. In large part due to the growing political efficacy of the women’s movement, the so-called marital rape exemption was
eliminated such that today it is a crime in all fifty states for a husband to rape
his wife.6 During the period of time these laws were changing, the same act
might be defined as rape in one jurisdiction but not-rape in another.
These two examples highlight an important aspect of definitional ruptures;
namely, that the changes in definition ultimately were motivated by a choice between competing values. There is no way to decide in the abstract what counts
as “really” dead. Defining death as the cessation of cardio-respiratory activities
represented a union of fact of essence and fact of usage for centuries. It worked.
It was only when medical advancements disrupted the natural attitude toward
“death” that we were forced to reckon with competing definitions, and as a society make the value choice that ultimately what is most important is brain activity. It was also a matter of changing values that led to the elimination of the
marital rape exemption, as second wave feminism fueled the value preference
that what matters for proscribed unwanted sexual activity is consent, regardless
of marital status or previous familiarity with the rapist.
When a definitional rupture occurs, the question shifts from the traditional
“What is X?” question to the pragmatic question “How ought we use this term
given our needs and interests in this context?” In matters of life and death, for
example, there are serious consequences to declaring someone dead, from filing
criminal charges of murder in some cases to being permitted to harvest organs
to transplant in another. What is needed can be described as a definitional rule
of the form “X counts as Y in context C.” We need a shared understanding of
when a particular person counts as live or dead in order to meet all sorts of
needs and interests—religious, legal, medical, familial, etc.
What I am describing as a pragmatic approach to definition is quite common
in matters of law and public policy. Most laws involving complex matters must
stipulate definitions of key terms. Such stipulative definitions are informed but
not constrained by previous usage of the terms, nor are they dependent on

3. Tucker v. Lower, 1 Va. Cir. 124 (Ct. Law & Eq., Richmond, Va., 1972).
4. Ronald Converse, But When Did He Die?: Tucker v. Lower and the Brain-Death Concept, 12
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 424 (1975).
5. Rape Definition, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at 1267 (7th ed., 1999) (emphasis added).
6. Kelly C. Connerton, The Resurgence of the Marital Rape Exemption: The Victimization of
Teens by Their Statutory Rapists, 61 ALBANY L. REV. 237, 240 (1997).
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some sort of ultimate determination of what the true nature of X (“death,”
“rape,” etc.) really is. Thus, a pragmatic approach is distinct from the purely
lexical or real approaches to definition.
Certain definitions set forth in law or public policy can be described as regulatory definitions, understood as stipulative definitions that function to regulate
some aspect of human behavior.7 Regulatory definitions can be found in a wide
array of contexts, not all of which involved the law, but generally have two elements in common. First, from the standpoint of linguistic behavior, regulatory
definitions advance “denotative conformity.” That is, learning the definitional
rule that “X counts as Y in context C” improves the odds that we understand
and describe aspects of our reality in a common manner. We want to be able to
observe a phenomenon and agree that X is a Y. We don’t always manage to
agree, but the goal of regulatory definitions is that we use language to describe
a situation in a predictable and shared manner. Thus, an important goal of regulatory definitions is denotative conformity.
Second, regulatory definitions are formulated and authorized by recognized
organizations or institutions, such as a state legislature or, to use a nongovernmental example, a professional sports organization such as Major League Baseball. Who decides what X counts as Y in context C is in a position of power.
Outside of the purview of those organizations or institutions, the rules potentially have no authority. Regulatory definitions always depend on the backing
of some sort of recognized entity that has been empowered to regulate a particular domain of human activity. Within the relevant contexts, specific individuals
typically are empowered by the regulating entities to decide whether X counts
as Y or not in any given instance, from an umpire declaring a balk to a medical
professional declaring a patient dead to a jury deciding whether a life-ending
act counts as murder or manslaughter.
Definitional disputes happen all the time. Sometimes a disagreement about
denoting a specific phenomenon leads to an explicit question of definition. Such
questions as “Is person X a patriot or a terrorist?” “Is Pluto a planet?” “Are
Robert Mapplethorpe’s X portfolio of photographs art or obscenity?” lead to a
demand for definitional clarity: What counts as a terrorist? What counts as a
planet? What counts as art? A pragmatic approach sets aside the unanswerable
philosophical question of what is X really and instead focuses on such questions
as: What is our purpose in defining in this context? What values and interests
are advanced by competing definitions? What are the practical implications of
identifying certain attributes as definitive? Who should have the authority to
define and the power to decide when X counts as Y in context C?

7. EDWARD SCHIAPPA, THE TRANSGENDER EXIGENCY: DEFINING SEX AND GENDER IN THE
21ST CENTURY (2022), chapter 1.
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III
WHAT HAS SEX GOT TO DO WITH IT?
As we enter the third decade of the 21st century, how we define sex--male
and female, women and men--is entering a stage one can describe as a definitional rupture. In the 1970s in the United States, second wave feminists
launched an important critique of the constraints imposed on women by dominant cultural norms. A key step in feminist theory was to draw a distinction between sex as a biological category and gender as a social category. The traditional belief that men and women have essentially different natures, rooted in
biology, has dominated thinking about sex roles throughout much of human history. Thus, drawing a distinction between biological sex and psychological gender was an important step for feminists challenging the legacy of biological essentialism that has been used to justify discrimination against women.8 The
word gender “was rapidly popularized in feminist political discourse as a tool to
intervene in arguments against biology.”9 It did not take long for it to become
standard in college textbooks in the humanities and social sciences to distinguish between sex as biological and gender as cultural/psychological.
For example, the glossary of a popular introductory textbook in sociology in
1981 noted: “Sex (male and female): Refers to the division of the human species
into the biological categories of male and female” and “Gender: Refers to social
conceptions about what personality trait and behavior are appropriate for
members of each sex.”10 A textbook in psychology noted that “Femininity and
masculinity are socially defined terms that are added to the biologically determined sex class of the individual. Gender defines the social and cultural meanings brought to each anatomical sex class; that is, children learn how to ‘pass as’
and ‘act as’ members of their assigned sexual categories.”11
The distinction between biological sex and cultural/psychological gender
continues to be influential. In a representative book on gender and sport, one
finds “sex ‘refers to a person’s biological status’ and can be identified by ‘sex
chromosomes, gonads, internal reproductive organs, and external genitalia’
while gender refers to ‘the attitudes, feelings, and behaviors that a given culture
associates with a person’s biological sex’.”12 The result of this dichotomy—sex
as biological, gender as cultural/psychological—can be described as related but
independent sets of definitional rules. For sex, the definitional rule would be
along the lines of Person X counts as M/F based on biology. For gender: Person

8. SANDRA LIPSITZ BEM, THE LENSES OF GENDER (1993); ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, THE
MYTHS OF GENDER: BIOLOGICAL THEORIES ABOUT WOMEN AND MEN (1985).
9. Anne Fausto-Sterling, On the Critiques of the Concept of Sex, 27 DIFFERENCES 189, 197
(2016).
10. IAN ROBERTSON, SOCIOLOGY, 2nd ed. (1981), 629–33.
11. ALFRED R. LINDESMITH, ANSELM L. STRAUSS, & NORMAN K. DENZIN, SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 16 (8th ed., 1999).
12. Leslee A. Fisher, Susannah K. Knust, Alicia J. Johnson, Theories of Gender and Sport, in
GENDER RELATIONS IN SPORTS (2013), 21, quoting the American Psychological Association.
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X counts as masculine/feminine/androgynous/gender-nonconformist based on
cultural norms. When definitions are widely shared and stable, definitional gaps
are relatively straightforward to resolve, so we typically do not have difficulty
knowing who is male or female, or describing people’s perceived gender preferences.
There are two factors contributing to the current definitional rupture—one
scientific, one sociopolitical. The first is a growing awareness that a nontrivial
number of humans defy the traditional biological ways of defining male and female. It is not uncommon to view the number and type of sex-related genes and
chromosomes as determining our sex (XX for women, XY for men), and we assume our genes determine external genitalia, internal reproductive anatomy
(such as the uterus in females), sex hormone levels produced by the body (such
as testosterone level), and the type of gonads (ovaries or testicles). But the situation is more complicated than that. The SRY (sex determining region Y) gene
is found on the Y chromosome. The protein produced by this gene initiates processes that cause a fetus to grow male gonads and stop the development of female reproductive body parts (uterus and fallopian tubes). However, it is possible for a SRY gene to end up on an X chromosome and thus for someone with
XX chromosomes to grow male characteristics including testes. This is called
“46,XX testicular disorder” and occurs in .005% of births (1 in 20,000).13 Alternatively, it is possible for a person with XY chromosomes to develop typical
female external genitalia, a condition known as the Swyer Syndrome, which is
estimated to occur in 1 in 80,000 births. Furthermore, as many as .005% of XY
males (2 to 5 per 100,000) experience androgen insensitivity, where their bodies
do not respond to certain male sex hormones, known as androgens, and have
mostly female external sex characteristics or “signs of both males and female
sexual development.”14 Other sorts of genetic variations are possible as well. In
short, even if we define male and female strictly according to the science of genetics, not every human neatly falls into one or the other category.
Just how many people are born with such Differences in Sexual Development (DSD) is a matter of some controversy. Because there is no systematic
record kept of DSD births, some of the physical traits covered by broader definitions may not be discovered until puberty, attempts are made to conceive a
child, or through genetic tests. Nonetheless, scientists have generated estimates
based on the available data. Not surprisingly, how many DSD individuals there
are depends on how one defines “intersex” or DSD. Using a narrow definition
limited to cases where chromosomal sex is inconsistent with phenotypic sex (observable body parts), or in which the phenotype is not classifiable simply as ei-

13. Statistics in this paragraph are drawn from the National Center for Biotechnology Information’s resource, Gene Reviews, available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK1116/
[https://perma.cc/LHM7-ETWF].
14. U.S. National Library of Medicine, MedlinePlus: Androgen insensitivity syndrome,
https://medlineplus.gov/genetics/condition/androgen-insensitivity-syndrome/
[https://perma.cc/3TL586EG].
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ther male or female, one estimate is as low as .018%.15 Using a broader definition of any deviation from the prototypical male/female categories at the chromosomal, genital, gonadal, or hormonal level, biologist Anne Fausto-Sterling
estimates the figure could be as high as 1.7%.16 More recent estimates of the
number of people described as having DSD have a similarly broad range. Medical conditions “in which an individual’s anatomical sex seems to be at odds with
their chromosomal or gonadal sex” are quite rare—one in 4,500 or .02%, a figure similar to Sax’s estimate.17 Some scientists feel that definition is too narrow.
Eric Vilain, a clinician and former director of the Center for Gender-Based Biology at the University of California, Los Angeles, for example, points out that
the “most inclusive definitions point to the figure of 1 in 100 people having
some form of DSD.”18
In any event, the point is that defining male and female in strictly biological
terms is more complex than it seems at first glance. Developmental biologist
Rebecca R. Helm, for example, posted a widely circulated series of tweets in
December 2019 stressing how complicated the idea of biological sex can become.19 She notes, for example, that a person can be born with XY chromosomes but if the SRY gene appears on the X chromosome instead of the Y, that
person could be physically female, chromosomally male, and genetically female.
So which attribute should be considered definitive? In personal correspondence, Helm noted that, “as a developmental biologist, I define male/female as
organisms producing sperm/eggs.” For the purposes of research as a develop15. Leonard Sax, How Common is Intersex? A Response to Anne Fausto-Sterling, 39 J. OF SEX
RESEARCH 174 (2002).
16. Anne Fausto-Sterling, The Five Sexes, Revisited, THE SCIENCES, July/August, 19. FaustoSterling’s oft-cited figure of 1.7% is based on a research review conducted with her students and reported in Melanie Blackless, et al., How Sexually Dimorphic Are We? Review and Synthesis, 12 AM. J.
OF HUMAN BIOLOGY 151 (2000). Carrie L. Hull, Letter to the Editor 15 AM. J. OF HUMAN BIOLOGY
112 (2003) accuses Blackless, et al. of a variety of serious errors and suggests a figure of .37%. Sax’s figure, supra note 15, of .018% is based on a definition that only “counts” congenital adrenal hyperplasia
(CAH) and complete androgen insensitivity syndrome (CAIS) as DSD conditions. Conditions that Sax
excludes but Fausto-Sterling includes are Late-Onset Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia, Vaginal Agenesis, and any sex chromosome combinations other than XX or XY (including but not limited to Klinefelter syndrome 47,XXY, Turner syndrome 45X, XXX, XYY, and other “less frequent arrangements”).
Sax’s explanation for the exclusion of these categories is that they do not cause ambiguous genitalia or,
he believes, “any confusion regarding sexual identity” (supra note 15, at 177). He notes that 88% of
those whom Fausto-Sterling classifies as “intersex” (DSD) are those with Late-Onset Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia or non-classic CAH (LOCAH). Hull makes a similar argument (supra, 113). Sax
claims: “From a clinician’s perspective, however, LOCAH is not an intersex condition. The genitalia of
these babies are normal at birth, and consonant with their chromosomes: XY males have normal male
genitalia, and XX females have normal female genitalia” (supra note 15, at 176). See also ANNE
FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE BODY: GENDER POLITICS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUALITY,
rev. ed., 324–26 (2020).
17. Claire Ainsworth, Sex Redefined: The Idea of 2 Sexes is Overly Simplistic, SCIENTIFIC AM.,
(Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/sex-redefined-the-idea-of-2-sexes-is-overlysimplistic1 [https://perma.cc/5H8V-4X92].
18. Id.
19. Biologist Explains Biological Sex, Geek X Girls (Jan. 29, 2020), geekxgirls.com
/article.php?ID=12697 [https://perma.cc/5PL8-PHS3].
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mental biologist, production of sperm or eggs (gametes) is “the key feature of
biological sex.” However, Helm is quick to note that, in other contexts, using
gametes as the definitive attribute for biological sex for categorizing humans
“would be extremely problematic.”20
Relatedly, historian and philosopher of science Sarah S. Richardson argues
against binary essentialist conceptions of sex and advocates what she describes
as “sex contextualism” for the study of sex-related biological variables in basic,
preclinical biomedical research. She argues that there are multiple ways to define or “pragmatically operationalize” sex in biomedical research, especially in a
laboratory context where the focus might be on hormone levels or chromosomes, for example, or involve “laboratory-tailored materials and technologies.”21 Inferences about humans may be based on other species with quite different sex-related processes, such as roundworms known as Caenorhabditis
elegans. Difference in hormone levels at different ages of mice indicates the
most useful interpretation of the data would posit 4 sex categories, not just two.
In short, Richardson’s analysis of a series of laboratory studies concludes that
the definition/operationalization depends on the specific research context and
purpose, so sex should be understood contextually.
Societies have long recognized the fact that some people are born, for example, with both male and female genitalia, and for centuries such individuals
would be described as “hermaphrodites.” Today, a person whose body varies
from the statistical norm for males and females in one or more of the areas described above may be categorized as “intersex” or as having a DSD. Nonetheless, public awareness of DSD has increased to the point that it is increasingly
common to see headlines such as “Sex Redefined: The Idea of 2 Sexes is Overly
Simplistic” followed with the subtitle “Biologists now think there is a larger
spectrum than just binary female and male.”22 While facially valid in light of research on people with DSD, there are some who infer from such headlines that
the ideas of male and female are biological stereotypes. An equally valid headline could read: “The Idea of 2 Biological Sexes is Accurate for 98%+ of the
population.” That is, because the vast majority of humans have an anatomy,
hormones, cells, and chromosomes that are consistently male or female, most of
the time and in most contexts, people use the words “female” and “male” accurately (with a high degree of denotative conformity) without confusion or fear
of contradiction. Once we add the idea of gender identity, of course, matters
become more complicated.
Indeed, the second factor contributing to the definitional rupture is the rise
of what I describe as the transgender exigency.23 Despite the fact that
transgender history is far from new, the visibility and salience of transgender is20. Personal Correspondence with the author, Mar. 4, 2020.
21. Sarah S. Richardson, Sex Contextualism, PHILOSOPHY, THEORY, & PRACTICE IN BIOLOGY
(forthcoming). Available at https://j.mp/366WuwN [https://perma.cc/DEJ6-QVC2].
22. Ainsworth, supra note 17.
23. Schiappa, supra note 7.
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sues has increased dramatically in the 21st Century.24 The resulting exigency has
amplified the rupture over how sex and gender are defined. On one end of the
spectrum, those who can be described as biological determinists argue that biological sex determines one’s gender and thus both are evident at birth or earlier,
and that one’s medical designation should determine a host of legal and societal
constraints based on one’s recorded sex. On the other end of spectrum, those
who might be called autonomous nominalists or advocates of “selfidentification” or “first-person authority” contend that sex/gender identity is
independent of biology and is a purely personal decision and, as such, should be
respected and never regulated or discriminated against. I use the construction
sex/gender because, for an increasing number of people, the two ideas are
fused: When a transgender woman says “I am a woman” or a transgender man
says “I am a man,” most of the time such claims entail a desire to be recognized
as a man or as a woman in all respects, including (for example) with official ID
that carries a designation by sex. In most social settings, a live and let live philosophy suggests that people ought to be able to identify themselves as they
wish. But what happens in specific contexts in which sex segregation is practiced? How do we define “sex” in those contexts? To begin to answer these
questions, we must return to the concept of regulatory definitions.
IV
REGULATORY DEFINITIONS & SEX
As noted earlier, regulatory definitions can be thought of as definitional
rules of the form “X counts as Y in context C.” The simplest way to describe
self-identification as a regulatory definition would be: Anyone who selfidentifies at the moment as a woman/man (X) counts as a women/man (Y) in
this context (C). Note that there is no temporal requirement of duration stipulated. Some contexts, such as bathrooms in states without so-called bathroom
bills, function with an implicit regulatory definition: People perceived as a male
/female (X) count as a man/woman (Y) in the context of public bathrooms and
changing facilities (C). In many non-institutional settings, the only definitional
“requirement” is that one passes.
It is harder to “pass” in some contexts than in others. As we move into the
third decade of the 21st century, there are contexts that traditionally have been
segregated by sex that are now wrestling with how to define women and men in
a manner that advances the needs and interests relevant to that context, and as
a result additional definitive attributes are implemented beyond selfidentification “at the moment.”
Many contexts stipulate what can be described as a durational requirement.
Such a requirement can be based on the past or on future intentions. For example, most single-sex schools that accept transgender applicants have a policy
24. JOANNE MEYEROWITZ, HOW SEX CHANGED: A HISTORY OF TRANSSEXUALITY IN THE
UNITED STATES (2002); SUSAN STRYKER, TRANSGENDER HISTORY (rev. ed.) 2017.
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that can be formulated as “Anyone who consistently lives and identifies as a
man/women (X) counts as a man/women (Y) in the context of applying to this
institution (C).” “Lives as” is somewhat open-ended, but in the context of a single-sex school, one’s future intentions are salient, and presumably one must
transition socially, including using gender-specific pronouns and names. The
core value that seems to inform the changing policies is a commitment to the
cause of feminism, which includes an acknowledgement that women have long
endured discrimination. Priya Kandaswamy, a faculty member at Mills College
who was on the subcommittee that drafted their new transgender policy, is
quoted as saying “We strongly identify with our original mission, but we do
think that women’s colleges were originally founded to make education more
accessible for those who were discriminated against based on gender and today
that includes transgender.”25 In a public letter by Wellesley College’s President
and Chair of the Board of Trustees announcing the decision to consider any applicant who “lives as a woman and consistently identifies as a woman,” it was
noted that the origin of Wellesley was an important social-political accomplishment: “The creation of Wellesley College was a revolutionary act, challenging and confounding entrenched views about the roles and capacities of
women.”26
Single-sex schools have dealt with the question of admitting transgender applicants by setting a relatively low bar for their regulatory definition. It may be
useful to consider a context where the bar is set higher; namely, jails and prisons.
V
DEFINING SEX: THE CASE OF INCARCERATION
Jails and prisons are an important context that is normally segregated by
sex. Historically, transgender people have been housed by their recorded sex at
birth, and it has not gone well for them. According to the U.S. Transgender
Survey of 2015, 23% of transgender inmates reported experiencing physical assault from prison staff or other prisoners in the previous year, and one in five
(20%) were sexually assaulted. Compared with the general U.S. prison population, transgender prisoners are 5 more times likely to be sexually abused by
prison staff and 9 times more likely to be sexually assaulted by other inmates.27
Accordingly, the segregation of prisoners by sex has put transgender prisoners,
a group expanding in number and estimated as at least 4,890 individuals to25. Quoted in Deana Mitchell, Mills College takes on the nuances of transgender admits (Oct. 2,
2014), https://oaklandnorth.net/2014/10/02/mills-college-takes-on-the-nuances-of-transgender-admits/
[https://perma.cc/GF5X-6WHB].
26. Laura Daignault Gates & H. Kim Bottomly, Reaffirmation of Mission and Announcing Gender
Policy (2014), https://www.wellesley.edu/news/gender-policy/communityletter [https://perma.cc/S2JBERNA].
27. SANDY E. JAMES, ET AL., THE REPORT OF THE 2015 U.S. TRANSGENDER SURVEY, 211–12
(2016).
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day—1,097 people self-reported as transgender among 141,500 prisoners (0.7%)
in Texas alone—in an awkward and often unsafe situation.28 In 2007, a study of
California prisons conducted by the University of California, Irvine’s Center for
Evidence-Based Corrections found that transgender women housed in male
prisons were 13 times (59%) more likely to experience sexual offenses than cisgender inmates (4.4%).29 Data from multiple years compiled by the Bureau of
Justice Statistics found that nearly 40% of transgender prisoners experienced
sexual abuse in federal and state prisons, as opposed to 4% of the general incarcerated population.30
Jurisdictions vary widely in terms of how they define women and men in
carceral settings. On one end of the spectrum, some jurisdictions rely exclusively on inmates’ assigned sex at birth. For example, state prisons in Texas house
transgender inmates based on their “sex at birth.”31 Thus: A prisoner whose assigned sex at birth is male/female (X) counts as a man/woman (Y) in the context
of the state prison (C).
Some jurisdictions make it possible for a transgender person to “count” as
the sex opposite of their assigned sex at birth, but require additional documentation beyond self-identification. In May, 2018, for example, Connecticut became the first state to enact a policy requiring the state Department of Correction to house prisoners according to their gender identity. The law only applies
to those who are “diagnosed with gender dysphoria or had their gender marker
legally changed.”32 The key definitive attribute informing Connecticut’s regulation of housing transgender prisoners is documentation: A prisoner whose legally- or diagnostically-documented gender is male/female (X) counts presumptively as a man/woman (Y) in the context of Connecticut prisons (C).
Massachusetts General Laws Title XVIII, c.127 § 32A amended by the
Criminal Justice Reform Act of 2018 stipulates that transgender inmates “with
or without a diagnosis of gender dysphoria or any other physical or mental
health diagnosis” shall be addressed and if requested, housed in a manner consistent with their gender identity, unless the commissioner certifies that such

28. Kate Sosin, Transgender women are nearly always incarcerated with men. That’s putting many
in danger. NBCNews.com, (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/transgenderwomen-are-nearly-always-incarcerated-men-s-putting-many-n1141681 [https://perma.cc/D8HU-FCUC].
29. Valerie Jenness, Cheryl L. Maxson, Kristy N. Matsuda, & Jennifer Macy Sumner, Violence in
California Correctional Facilities: An Empirical Examination of Sexual Assault (May 16, 2007),
https://ucicorrections.seweb.uci.edu/files/2013/06/PREA_Presentation_PREA_Report_UCI_Jenness_et
_al.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WHS-EBWK].
30. ALLEN J. BECK, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION IN PRISONS AND JAILS REPORTED BY INMATES,
2011-2012, U.S. Dept. of Justice (Dec. 2014).
31. Lauren McGaughy, After transgender inmate was raped, beaten, Texas agrees to clarify
LGBTQ prisons policies, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (May 15, 2018), https://www.dallasnews.com/news
/2018/03/15/after-transgender-inmate-was-raped-beaten-texas-agrees-to-clarify-lgbt-prisoner-policies/
[https://perma.cc/UVG3-NGSA].
32. John Riley, Connecticut will now house transgender inmates according to gender identity,
METRO WEEKLY (May 28, 2018), https://www.metroweekly.com/2018/05/connecticut-housetransgender-inmates-according-gender-identity/ [https://perma.cc/T4TR-FWQM].
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placement would not ensure prisoners’ safety or would present management or
security concerns. Such an approach empowers inmates’ own sense of identity
as the presumptive criterion for inmate placement decisions. Only when inmates’ own preferences pose security risks would the default decision based on
identity be challenged. Similarly, California passed legislation, signed into law
in September 2020, requiring that transgender inmates “Be housed at a correctional facility designated for men or women based on the individual’s preference” in all situations unless there are “management or security concerns”.33 In
such jurisdictions, the regulatory definition reflected by these policies therefore
would be: A prisoner whose self-identified gender identity is male/female (X)
counts presumptively as a man/woman (Y) in the context of the relevant jail or
prison (C), and that presumption is rebutted only if it can be shown that there
are meaningful management or security concerns.
One sign of a definitional rupture is a breakdown of denotative conformity,
and that is clearly the situation when it comes to different state regulatory definitions regarding sex segregation in the context of incarceration. The same person “counts” as a man in one jurisdiction but would count as a woman in another.
Justice Louis Brandeis famously said that states may “serve as a laboratory”
to “try novel social and economic experiments.”34 As states experiment with different definitional policies with regard to transgender inmates, undoubtedly data will emerge to show the relative strengths and weaknesses of different definitional approaches. For example, there have been allegations that a policy of
placement based on self-identification is being abused in one county facility in
the state of Washington, and that at least one inmate incarcerated for a sex offense arrived “from a male facility” and raped a female in the women’s prison
soon after.35 The Los Angeles Times reports that “A transgender woman at a
men’s prison, who asked not to be identified for fear of retaliation, said that she
knows at least five inmates who have applied to transfer under false pretenses
and that staffers have asked her to help identify such inmates.”36 True or not,
such allegations raise fears of cisgender male inmates trying to game the system
to get placed in women’s facilities.37

33. Cal. SB-132, sec. 4 (2020).
34. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 311 (1932).
35. Dori Monson, DOC employee reports men are claiming to be women to transfer prisons, (Mar.
10, 2021), mynorthwest.com/2666243/ [https://perma.cc/3VWH-XBHT].
36. Leila Miller, California prisons grapple with hundreds of transgender inmates requesting new
housing, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2021), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2021-04-05/californiaprisons-consider-gender-identity-housing-requests (last accessed Jan. 8, 2022).
37. See, e.g., Abigail Shrier, Male Inmates in Women’s Prisons, WALL STREET J. (May 31, 2021),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/male-inmates-in-womens-prisons-11622474215 (last accessed Jan. 7, 2022).
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VI
CONCLUSION
Regulatory definitions in contexts in which segregation by sex is desired for
various reasons, such as single-sex schools, bathrooms, locker rooms, competitive sports, and women’s shelters, constitute a historic break from assuming that
a straightforward biological definition provides a one-size-fits-all approach to
defining sex. On one hand, a too-narrowly tailored biological definition erases
transgender, nonbinary, gender-fluid, and DSD people and perpetuates biological essentialism—a key source of sexist prejudice throughout much of history.
On the other hand, pure autonomous nominalism—gender-fluid selfidentification unfettered by time or place—denies the possibility of legitimate
concerns in specific sex-segregated contexts.
So how should such regulatory definitions be crafted? To state the obvious:
Very carefully. Once we set aside the need for a one-size-fits-all set of definitions, then we are able to look at pragmatic issues such as who should have the
power to define, whose interests are being served, and above all the purpose a
given definition is serving in a specific context. In an earlier book on definitions,
I argued that when we are faced with a definitional rupture the “What is X?”
question needs to be replaced with questions such as, “How ought we use the
word X given our needs and interests?” “What is the purpose of defining X?,”
and “What should count as X in context C?” I advocated a pragmatic approach
that sees definitions as made not found, and treats the definitional process as
one involving important ethical questions of values, interests, and power.38
Applying such a pragmatic approach to defining sex/gender, one can envision a series of steps of required definitional attributes to “count” as a man or
woman according to context-specific regulatory definitions. At the bottom is
simply self-identification as a man or a woman: A self-declaration is the sufficient attribute. While self-identification or first-person authority should be presumptive whenever and wherever possible, there are important contexts in
which something more than a potentially ephemeral self-identification is justifiable. That is, there are contexts of human interaction that have been segregated
by sex for credible reasons, and the reasons should be matched up with appropriate regulatory definitions. Think of a shelter for battered women, a scholarship program to encourage girls to seek a STEM education, medical trials for
breast cancer treatment, a cloistered convent, a women-only train car, single-sex
schools, locker rooms, competitive sports, and prisons, as examples. What sort
of context-specific regulatory definitions would be appropriate? I suggest that
the further definitional criteria move away from self-identification the more
compelling the justification for segregation by sex needs to be.
Thus the next step would be a durational requirement, such as the requirement by some women’s colleges that applicants live and identify as women.
Such a durational requirement might be prospective—that is, a young person
38. Schiappa, supra note 1.
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starting college intends to live as a woman—or it may be retrospective—that is,
a person has lived as a woman or man for a specified length of time. A purely
durational requirement generally assumes a minimum of social transitioning,
such as a change in pronouns, name, and manner of self-presentation, but such
a social transition may or may not be specifically required.

Requiring a documented diagnosis of gender dysphoria or transgender identity would be the next step, since it would require action by a health professional that, unlike purely durational criteria, go beyond the affected person’s immediate control. Similarly, the next step involves gender-affirming hormone
therapy, which also normally requires the cooperation of health professionals.
In this hypothesized graduated series of required definitional attributes, the top
step would be gender affirmation surgery, including so-called “top” and “bottom” surgery.
Currently, different regulatory contexts impose different definitional requirements to “count” as female or male. Changing the sex listed on one’s birth
certificate is regulated by states. Most states require either that one has undergone gender affirmation surgery or have a doctor’s letter indicating the person
has changed sex/gender without requiring surgery.
In athletic competition, typically segregated by sex, one finds selfidentification as the sole definitional attribute required in some states (such as
Connecticut), while to compete in events sanctioned by the NCAA, transgender
women athletes must first complete one calendar year of testosterone suppression treatment. The International Olympic Committee has changed their re-
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quired definitional attributes for transgender athletes over time. The IOC’s Executive Board in 2004 included durational, legal, anatomical (surgical) and
hormonal definitional criteria. They then revised those criteria in 2015 to focus
on duration and hormonal (testosterone) levels.39 Yet another approach that
may recommend diluting the hormonal requirement is pending.40
One could envision the steps of required definitional attributes as requiring
increasingly compelling justification provided by the defining authority as one
moves up it, as provided in the graphic.41 Not unlike the concept of “levels of
scrutiny” in U.S. constitutional law, the greater the burden on the individual to
comply, the more compelling the justification should be, with the strictest scrutiny reserved for the most onerous requirement—surgery.
The definitional ruptures I have described are likely to continue. Currently
the rupture is so great that even within a shared context of human activity (say,
housing inmates in carceral settings, or high school athletics), the variety of regulations across different jurisdictions result in the assessment that the same person “counts” as male in one jurisdiction and female in another. Such crossjurisdictional ruptures eventually will be reconciled by the courts, one might
reasonably assume, though the practice of having distinct required definitional
attributes in different activities is likely to remain.
Some argue for a one-size fits all approach to transgender men and women,
claiming that if a person is recognized in one context as a woman or man, then it
becomes a “rights issue” that person be so recognized in all contexts.42 Such a
claim begs the question at hand and ignores the importance of context. There
are other concepts that have an ordinary meaning that require specificity in certain contexts. Consider the word “adult.” The word has an ordinary meaning,
but in practice means something different to a biologist (sexual maturity), with
respect to alcohol laws or voting eligibility, and in contexts where a person may
be “tried” as an adult.43 Similarly, while there is controversy over the concept of
transracialism, it seems uncontroversial that racial self-identification is unproblematic in some contexts but is an inadequate definitive attribute in the context,
for example, of reparations efforts.44 In short, context matters, especially in a
conceptual domain as contested as sex/gender, and we need to do the tough
work of figuring out how and when different definitional attributes matter and
when they do not.

39. See Joanna Harper’s essay in this issue and Schiappa, supra note 1, Chapter 7.
40. See id.
41. The author is grateful to Andrew Whitacre for his work developing the graphic.
42. See, e.g., Rachel McKinnon’s comments in Scott Gleeson and Erik Brady, These transgender
cyclists have Olympian disagreement on how to define fairness, USA TODAY, Jan. 11, 2018,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/olympics/2018/01/11/these-transgender-cyclists-have-olympiandisagreement-how-define-fairness/995434001/ [https://perma.cc/Z8HM-PS8L].
43. See, e.g., Maria Cramer, When are you really an adult?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2020, at A17.
44. WILLIAM DARITY & A. KIRSTEN MULLEN, FROM HERE TO EQUALITY: REPARATIONS FOR
BLACK AMERICANS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2020).
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As the famed philosopher W. V. O. Quine noted, “Our patterns of thought
or language have been evolving, under pressure of inherent inadequacies and
changing needs, since the dawn of language; and, whether we help guide it or
not, we may confidently look forward to more of the same.”45 As our understanding of and attitudes about sex and gender continue to evolve, we can expect our definitional habits to need to evolve as well.

45. W.V.O. QUINE, ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY AND OTHER ESSAYS 24 (1969).

